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Abstract
Metric learning is an important family of algorithms for classification and similarity search,
but the robustness of learned metrics against small adversarial perturbations is less studied. In
this paper, we show that existing metric learning algorithms, which focus on boosting the clean
accuracy, can result in metrics that are less robust than the Euclidean distance. To overcome this
problem, we propose a novel metric learning algorithm to find a Mahalanobis distance that is
robust against adversarial perturbations, and the robustness of the resulting model is certifiable.
Experimental results show that the proposed metric learning algorithm improves both certified
robust errors and empirical robust errors (errors under adversarial attacks). Furthermore, unlike
neural network defenses which usually encounter a trade-off between clean and robust errors, our
method does not sacrifice clean errors compared with previous metric learning methods. Our code
is available at https://github.com/wangwllu/provably_robust_metric_learning.
1 Introduction
Metric learning has been an important family of machine learning algorithms and has achieved
successes on several problems, including computer vision [24, 17, 18], text analysis [27], meta
learning [38, 35] and others [34, 45, 47]. Given a set of training samples, metric learning aims to
learn a good distance measurement such that items in the same class are closer to each other in the
learned metric space, which is crucial for classification and similarity search. Since this objective
is directly related to the assumption of nearest neighbor classifiers, most of the metric learning
algorithms can be naturally and successfully combined with K-Nearest Neighbor (K-NN) classifiers.
Adversarial robustness of machine learning algorithms has been studied extensively in recent
years due to the need of robustness guarantees in real world systems. It has been demonstrated that
neural networks can be easily attacked by adversarial perturbations in the input space [37, 16, 2], and
such perturbations can be computed efficiently in both white-box [4, 29] and black-box settings [7,
19, 9]. Therefore, many defense algorithms have been proposed to improve the robustness of neural
networks [26, 29]. Although these algorithms can successfully defend from standard attacks, it has
been shown that many of them are vulnerable under stronger attacks when the attacker knows the
defense mechanisms [4]. Therefore, recent research in adversarial defense of neural networks has
shifted to the concept of “certified defense”, where the defender needs to provide a certification that
no adversarial examples exist within a certain input region [43, 11, 48].
In this paper, we consider the problem of learning a metric that is robust against adversarial input
perturbations. It has been shown that nearest neighbor classifiers are not robust [31, 39, 33], where a
small and human imperceptible perturbation in the input space can easily fool a K-NN classifier, thus
it is natural to investigate how to obtain a metric that improves the adversarial robustness. Despite
being an important and interesting research question to tackle, to the best of our knowledge this
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Figure 1: Decision boundaries of 1-NN with different Mahalanobis distances.
problem has not been studied in the literature. There are several caveats that make this a hard problem:
1) attack and defense algorithms for neural networks often rely on the smoothness of the function,
while K-NN is a discrete step function where the gradient does not exist. 2) Even evaluating the
robustness of K-NN (with the Euclidean distance) is harder than neural networks. For instance,
[39] showed that attacks to K-NN are time consuming and nontrivial. Furthermore, none of the
existing work have considered general Mahalanobis distances. 3) Existing algorithms for evaluating
the robustness of K-NN, including attack [46] and verification [39], are often non-differentiable,
while training a robust metric will require a differentiable measurement of robustness.
To develop a provably robust metric learning algorithm, we formulate an objective function to
learn a Mahalanobis distance, parameterized by a positive semi-definite matrixM , that maximizes
the minimal adversarial perturbation on each sample. However, computing the minimal adversarial
perturbation is intractable for K-NN, so to make the problem solvable, we propose an efficient
formulation for lower-bounding the minimal adversarial perturbation, and this lower bound can be
represented as an explicit function of M to enable the gradient computation. We further develop
several tricks to improve the efficiency of the overall procedure. Similar to certified defense algorithms
in neural networks, the proposed algorithm can provide a certified robustness improvement on
the resulting K-NN model with the learned metric. Decision boundaries of 1-NN with different
Mahalanobis distances for a toy dataset are visualized in Figure 1. It can be observed that the
proposed Adversarial Robust Metric Learning (ARML) method can obtain a more robust metric on
this example.
We conduct extensive experiments on six real world datasets and show that the proposed algorithm
can improve both certified robust errors and the empirical robust errors (errors under adversarial
attacks) over existing metric learning algorithms.
2 Background
Metric learning for nearest neighbor classifiers A nearest-neighbor classifier based on a Maha-
lanobis distance could be characterized by a training dataset and a positive semi-definite matrix.
Let X = RD be the instance space, Y = [C] the label space where C is the number of classes.
S = {(xi, yi)}Ni=1 is the training set with (xi, yi) ∈ X × Y for every i ∈ [N ]. M ∈ RD×D is a
positive semi-definite matrix. The Mahalanobis distance for any x,x′ ∈ X is defined as
dM (x,x
′) = (x− x′)>M(x− x′), (1)
and a Mahalanobis K-NN classifier f : X→ Y will find the K nearest neighbors of the test instance
in S based on the Mahalanobis distance, and then predicts the label based on majority voting of these
neighbors.
Many metric learning approaches aim to learn a good Mahalanobis distanceM based on training
data, including [15, 12, 41, 20, 36] (see more discussions in Section 5). However, none of these
previous methods are trying to find a metric that is robust to small input perturbations.
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Adversarial robustness and minimal adversarial perturbation There are two important con-
cepts in adversarial robustness: adversarial attack and adversarial verification (or robustness veri-
fication). Adversarial attack aims to find a perturbation to change the prediction, and adversarial
verification aims to find a radius within which no perturbation could change the prediction. Both of
them can be reduced to the problem of finding the minimal adversarial perturbation. For a classifier f
on an instance (x, y), the minimal adversarial perturbation can be defined as
arg min
δ
‖δ‖ s.t. f(x+ δ) 6= y, (2)
which is the smallest perturbation that could lead to misclassification. Note that if (x, y) is not
correctly classified, the minimal adversarial perturbation is 0, i.e., the zero vector. Let δ∗(x, y)
denote the optimal solution and ∗(x, y) = ‖δ∗(x, y)‖ the optimal value. Obviously, δ∗(x, y) is also
the solution of the optimal adversarial attack, and ∗(x, y) is the solution of the optimal adversarial
verification. For neural networks, it is often NP-complete to compute (2), so many efficient algorithms
have been proposed for attack [16, 4, 3, 9] and verification [43, 42, 30], corresponding to computing
upper and lower bounds of (2) respectively. However, these methods do not work for discrete models
such as nearest neighbor classifiers.
In this paper our algorithm will be based on a novel derivation of a lower bound of the minimal
adversarial perturbation for Mahalanobis K-NN classifiers. To the best of our knowledge, there has
been no previous work tackling this problem. Since the Mahalanobis K-NN classifier is parame-
terized by a positive semi-definite matrixM and the training set S, we further let δ∗S(x, y;M) and
∗S(x, y;M) explicitly indicate their dependence onM and S. In this paper we will consider `2 norm
in (2) for simplicity.
Certified and empirical robust error Let ∗(x, y) be a lower bound of the norm of the minimal
adversarial perturbation ∗(x, y), possibly computed by a robustness verification algorithm. For a
distribution D over X× Y, the certified robust error with respect to the radius  ≥ 0 is defined as
the probability that ∗(x, y) is not greater than , namely
cre() = E(x,y)∼D[1{∗(x, y) ≤ }]. (3)
Note that in the case  = 0 and ∗(x, y) = ∗(x, y), the certified robust error is reduced to the clean
error. In this paper we will investigate how to compute it for Mahalanobis K-NN classifiers.
On the other hand, adversarial attack algorithms are trying to find a feasible solution of (2),
which will give an upper bound ¯∗(x, y) ≥ ∗(x, y). Based on the upper bound, we can measure the
empirical robust error of a model by
ere() = E(x,y)∼D[1{∗(x, y) ≤ }]. (4)
Since ∗(x, y) is computed by an attack method, the empirical robust error is also called the attack
error. A family of decision-based attack methods, which view the victim model as a black-box, can
be used to attack Mahalanobis K-NN classifiers [3, 8, 9].
3 Adversarially robust metric learning
The objective of adversarially robust metric learning (ARML) is to learn the matrix M via the
training data S such that the resulting Mahalanobis K-NN classifier has small certified and empirical
robust errors.
3.1 Basic formulation
The goal is to learn a positive semi-definite matrixM to minimize the certified robust training error.
Since the certified robust error defined in (3) is non-smooth, we replace the indicator function by a
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loss function. The resulting objective can be formulated as
min
G∈RD×D
1
N
N∑
i=1
`
(
∗S−{(xi,yi)}(xi, yi;M)
)
s.t.M = G>G, (5)
where ` : R → R is an monotonically non-increasing function, e.g., the hinge loss [1 − ]+,
exponential loss exp(−), logistic loss log(1 + exp(−)), or “negative” loss −. We also employG
to enforceM to be positive semi-definite, and it is possible to derive a low-rankM by constraining
the shape ofG. Note that the minimal adversarial perturbation is defined on the training set excluding
(xi, yi), since otherwise a 1-nearest neighbor classifier with any distance measurement will have
100% accuracy. In this way, we minimize the “leave-one-out” certified robust error. The remaining
problem is how to exactly compute or approximate ∗S(x, y;M) in our training objective.
3.2 Bounding minimal adversarial perturbation for MahalanobisK-NN
For convenience, supposeK is an odd number and denote k = (K+1)/2. In the binary classification
case for simplicity, i.e., C = 2, the computation of ∗S(xtest, ytest;M) for Mahalanobis K-NN could
be formulated as
min
J⊆{j:yj 6=ytest},|J|=k
I⊆{i:yi=ytest},|I|=k−1
min
δI,J
‖δI,J‖
s.t. dM (xtest + δI,J,xj) ≤ dM (xtest + δI,J,xi),
∀j ∈ J, ∀i ∈ {i : yi = ytest} − I.
(6)
This minimization formulation enumerates all the K-size nearest neighbor set containing at most
k− 1 instances in the same class with the test instance, computes the minimum perturbation resulting
in each K-nearest neighbor set, and takes the minimum of them.
Obviously, solving (6) exactly has time complexity growing exponentially with K, and further-
more, a numerical solution cannot be incorporated into the training objective (5) since we need to
write ∗ as a function ofM for back-propagation. To address these issues, we resort to a lower bound
of the optimal value of (6) rather than solving it exactly.
First, we consider a simple triplet problem: given vectors x+,x−,x ∈ RD and a positive
semi-definite matrixM ∈ RD×D, find the minimum perturbation δ ∈ RD on x such that dM (x+
δ,x−) ≤ dM (x+ δ,x+) holds. It could be formulated as the following optimization problem
min
δ
‖δ‖ s.t. dM (x+ δ,x−) ≤ dM (x+ δ,x+). (7)
Note that the constraint in (7) can be written as a linear form, so this is a convex quadratic program-
ming problem with a linear constraint. We show that the optimal value of (7) can be expressed in
closed form:
[dM (x,x
−)− dM (x,x+)]+
2
√
(x+ − x−)>M>M(x+ − x−) , (8)
where [·] denotes max(·, 0). The derivation for the optimal value is deferred to Appendix A. Note
that ifM is the identity matrix and dM (x,x−) > dM (x,x+) strictly holds, then the optimal value
is the Euclidean distance from x to the bisection between x+ and x−.
For convenience, we define the function ˜ : RD × RD × RD → R as
˜(x+,x−,x;M) =
dM (x,x
−)− dM (x,x+)
2
√
(x+ − x−)>M>M(x+ − x−) . (9)
Then we could relax (6) further and have the following theorem:
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Theorem 1 (Robustness verification for MahalanobisK-NN). Given a MahalanobisK-NN classifier
parameterized by a neighbor parameter K, a training dataset S and a positive semi-definite matrix
M , for any instance (xtest, ytest) we have
∗(xtest, ytest;M) ≥ kth min
j:yj 6=ytest
kth max
i:yi=ytest
˜(xi,xj ,xtest;M), (10)
where kth max and kth min select the k-th maximum and k-th minimum respectively with k =
(K + 1)/2.
The proof is deferred to Appendix B. In this way, we only need to compute ˜(xi,xj ,xtest) for
each i and j in order to derive a lower bound of the minimal adversarial perturbation of Mahalanobis
K-NN. It leads to an efficient algorithm to verify the robustness of Mahalanobis K-NN. The time
complexity is O(N2) and independent of K.
In the general multi-class case, the constraint of (6) is the necessary condition for successful
attacks, rather than the necessary and sufficient condition. As a result, the optimal value of (6) is
a lower bound of the minimal adversarial perturbation. Therefore, Theorem 1 also holds for the
multi-class case. Based on this lower bound of ∗, we will derive the proposed ARML algorithm.
3.3 Training algorithm of adversarially robust metric learning
By replacing the ∗ in (5) with the lower bound derived in Theorem 1, we get a trainable objective
function for adversarially robust metric learning:
min
G∈RD×D
1
N
N∑
t=1
`
(
kth min
j:yj 6=yt
kth max
i:i 6=t,yi=yt
˜(xi,xj ,xt;M)
)
s.t.M = G>G. (11)
Although (11) is trainable since ˜ is a function ofM , for large datasets it is time-consuming to
run the inner min-max procedure. Furthermore, since we care about the generalization performance
of the learned metric instead of the robust training error, it is unnecessary to compute the exact
solution. Therefore, instead of computing the kth max and kth min exactly, we propose to sample
positive and negative instances from the neighborhood, which leads to the following formulation:
min
G∈RD×D
1
N
N∑
i=1
`
(
˜
(
randnear+M (xi), randnear
−
M (xi),xi;M
))
s.t.M = G>G, (12)
where randnear+M (·) denotes a sampling procedure for an instance in the same class within xi’s
neighborhood, and randnear−M (·) denotes a sampling procedure for an instance in a different class,
also within xi’s neighborhood, and the distances are measured by the Mahalanobis distance dM . In
our implementation, we sample instances from a fixed number of nearest instances. As a result, the
optimization formulation (12) approximately minimizes the certified robust error.
Our adversarially robust metric learning (ARML) algorithm is shown in Algorithm 1. At every
iteration,G is updated with the gradient, while the calculations of randnear+M (·) and randnear−M (·)
do not contribute to the gradient for the sake of efficient and stable computation.
3.4 Exact minimal adversarial perturbation of Mahalanobis 1-NN
In the special Mahalanobis 1-NN case, we will show a method to compute the exact minimal
adversarial perturbation in a similar formulation to (6). However, this algorithm can only compute a
numerical value of the minimal adversarial perturbation ∗, so it cannot be used in training time. We
will use this method to evaluate the robust error for the Mahalanobis 1-NN case in the experiments.
Computing the minimal adversarial perturbation ∗S(xtest, ytest;M) for Mahalanobis 1-NN classi-
fier can be formulated as the following optimization problem:
min
j:yj 6=ytest
min
δj
‖δj‖ s.t. dM (xtest + δj ,xj) ≤ dM (xtest + δj ,xi), ∀i : yi = ytest. (13)
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Algorithm 1: Adversarially robust metric learning (ARML)
Input: Training data S, number of epochs T .
Output: Positive semi-definite matrixM .
1 InitializeG andM as identity matrices ;
2 for t = 0 . . . T − 1 do
3 UpdateG with the gradient
E(x,y)∈S∇G`
(
˜
(
randnear+M (x), randnear
−
M (x),x;G
>G
))
;
4 UpdateM with the constraintM = G>G;
5 end
This is equivalent to considering each xj in a different class from ytest and computing the minimum
perturbation needed for making xtest closer to xj than all the training instances in the same class with
ytest, i.e., xis,. It is noteworthy that the constraint of (13) could be equivalently written as
(xi − xj)>Mδ ≤ 1
2
(dM (xtest,xi)− dM (xtest,xj)) , ∀i : yi = ytest, (14)
which are all affine functions. Therefore, the inner minimization is a convex quadratic programming
problem and could be solved in polynomial time [22]. As a result, it leads to a naive polynomial-time
algorithm for finding the minimal adversarial perturbation of Mahalanobis 1-NN: solve all the inner
quadratic programming problems and then select the minimum of them.
Instead, we propose a much more efficient method to solve (13). The main idea is to compute
a lower bound for each inner minimization problem first, and with these lower bounds, we could
screen most of the inner minimization problems safely without the need of solving them exactly. This
method is an extension of [39], where they only take the Euclidean distance into consideration. See
Algorithm 2 in Appendix C for details and this algorithm is used for computing certified robust errors
of Mahalanobis 1-NN in the experimental section.
4 Experiments
We compare the proposed ARML (Adversarial Robust Metric Learning) method with the following
baselines:
• Euclidean: uses the Euclidean distance directly without learning any metric;
• Neighbourhood components analysis (NCA) [15]: maximizes a stochastic variant of the
leave-one-out nearest neighbors score on the training set.
• Large margin nearest neighbor (LMNN) [41]: keeps close nearest neighbors from the same
class, while keeps instances from different classes separated by a large margin.
• Information Theoretic Metric Learning (ITML) [12]: minimizes the log-determinant divergence
with similarity and dissimilarity constraints.
• Local Fisher Discriminant Analysis (LFDA) [36]: a modified version of linear discriminant
analysis by rewriting scatter matrices in a pairwise manner.
For evaluation, we use six public datasets on which metric learning methods perform favorably in
terms of clean errors, including four small or medium-sized datasets [5]: Splice, Pendigits, Satimage
and USPS, and two image datasets MNIST [28] and Fashion-MNIST [44], which are wildly used for
robust verification for neural networks. For the proposed method, we use the same hyperparameters
for all the datasets (see Appendix D for the dataset statistics, more details of the experimental setting,
and hyperparameter sensitivity analysis).
Mahalanobis 1-NN Certified robust errors of Mahalanobis 1-NN with respect to different perturba-
tions are shown in Table 1. Note that for 1-NN, the proposed algorithm in Algorithm 2, which solves
(13), can compute the exact minimal adversarial perturbation for each instance, so the values we get
in Table 1 are both certified robust errors and empirical robust errors (attack errors). Also, note that
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Table 1: Certified robust errors of Mahalanobis 1-NN. The best (minimum) certified robust errors
among all methods are in bold. Note that the certified robust errors of 1-NN are also the optimal
attack errors.
MNIST
`2-radius 0.000 0.500 1.000 1.500 2.000 2.500
Euclidean 0.033 0.112 0.274 0.521 0.788 0.945
NCA 0.025 0.140 0.452 0.839 0.977 1.000
LMNN 0.032 0.641 0.999 1.000 1.000 1.000
ITML 0.073 0.571 0.928 1.000 1.000 1.000
LFDA 0.152 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
ARML (Ours) 0.024 0.089 0.222 0.455 0.757 0.924
Fashion-MNIST
`2-radius 0.000 0.500 1.000 1.500 2.000 2.500
Euclidean 0.145 0.381 0.606 0.790 0.879 0.943
NCA 0.116 0.538 0.834 0.950 0.998 1.000
LMNN 0.142 0.756 0.991 1.000 1.000 1.000
ITML 0.163 0.672 0.929 0.998 1.000 1.000
LFDA 0.211 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
ARML (Ours) 0.127 0.348 0.568 0.763 0.859 0.928
Splice
`2-radius 0.000 0.100 0.200 0.300 0.400 0.500
Euclidean 0.320 0.513 0.677 0.800 0.854 0.880
NCA 0.130 0.252 0.404 0.584 0.733 0.836
LMNN 0.190 0.345 0.533 0.697 0.814 0.874
ITML 0.306 0.488 0.679 0.809 0.862 0.882
LFDA 0.264 0.434 0.605 0.760 0.845 0.872
ARML (Ours) 0.130 0.233 0.370 0.526 0.652 0.758
Pendigits
`2-radius 0.000 0.100 0.200 0.300 0.400 0.500
Euclidean 0.032 0.119 0.347 0.606 0.829 0.969
NCA 0.034 0.202 0.586 0.911 0.997 1.000
LMNN 0.029 0.183 0.570 0.912 0.995 0.999
ITML 0.049 0.308 0.794 0.991 1.000 1.000
LFDA 0.042 0.236 0.603 0.912 0.998 1.000
ARML (Ours) 0.028 0.115 0.344 0.598 0.823 0.967
Satimage
`2-radius 0.000 0.150 0.300 0.450 0.600 0.750
Euclidean 0.108 0.642 0.864 0.905 0.928 0.951
NCA 0.103 0.710 0.885 0.915 0.940 0.963
LMNN 0.092 0.665 0.871 0.912 0.944 0.969
ITML 0.127 0.807 0.979 1.000 1.000 1.000
LFDA 0.125 0.836 0.919 0.956 0.992 1.000
ARML (Ours) 0.095 0.605 0.839 0.899 0.920 0.946
USPS
`2-radius 0.000 0.500 1.000 1.500 2.000 2.500
Euclidean 0.045 0.224 0.585 0.864 0.970 0.999
NCA 0.056 0.384 0.888 0.987 1.000 1.000
LMNN 0.046 0.825 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
ITML 0.060 0.720 0.999 1.000 1.000 1.000
LFDA 0.098 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
ARML (Ours) 0.043 0.204 0.565 0.857 0.970 0.999
when radius= 0, the resulting certified robust error is equivalent to the clean error on the unperturbed
test set.
We have three main observations from the experimental results. First, although NCA and LMNN
achieve better clean errors (at the radius 0) than Euclidean in most datasets, they are less robust to
adversarial perturbations than Euclidean (except the Splice dataset, on which Euclidean performs
overly poorly in terms of clean errors). Both NCA and LMNN suffer from the trade-off between
the clean error and the certified robust error. Second, ARML performs competitively with NCA
and LMNN in terms of clean errors (achieves the best on 4/6 of the datasets). Third and the most
importantly, ARML is much more robust than all the other methods in terms of certified robust errors
for nearly all perturbation radii.
Mahalanobis K-NN For K-NN models, it is intractable to compute the exact minimal adversarial
perturbation, so we report both certified robust errors and empirical robust errors (attack errors). We
set K = 11 for all the experiments. The certified robust error can be computed by Theorem 1, which
works for any Mahalanobis metric. On the other hand, we also conduct adversarial attack to these
models to derive the empirical robust error — the lower bounds of the certified robust errors — via a
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Table 2: Certified robust errors (left) and empirical robust errors (right) of Mahalanobis K-NN. The
best (minimum) robust errors among all methods are in bold.
Certified robust errors Empirical robust errors
MNIST
`2-radius 0.000 0.500 1.000 1.500 2.000 2.500 0.000 0.500 1.000 1.500 2.000 2.500
Euclidean 0.038 0.134 0.360 0.618 0.814 0.975 0.031 0.063 0.104 0.155 0.204 0.262
NCA 0.030 0.175 0.528 0.870 0.986 1.000 0.027 0.063 0.120 0.216 0.330 0.535
LMNN 0.040 0.669 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.036 0.121 0.336 0.775 0.972 1.000
ITML 0.106 0.731 0.943 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.084 0.218 0.355 0.510 0.669 0.844
LFDA 0.237 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.215 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
ARML (Ours) 0.034 0.101 0.276 0.537 0.760 0.951 0.032 0.055 0.077 0.109 0.160 0.213
Fashion-MNIST
`2-radius 0.000 0.500 1.000 1.500 2.000 2.500 0.000 0.500 1.000 1.500 2.000 2.500
Euclidean 0.160 0.420 0.650 0.800 0.895 0.946 0.143 0.227 0.298 0.360 0.420 0.489
NCA 0.144 0.557 0.832 0.946 1.000 1.000 0.121 0.232 0.343 0.483 0.624 0.780
LMNN 0.158 0.792 0.991 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.140 0.364 0.572 0.846 0.983 0.999
ITML 0.236 0.784 0.949 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.209 0.460 0.692 0.892 0.978 1.000
LFDA 0.291 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.263 0.870 0.951 0.975 0.988 0.995
ARML (Ours) 0.152 0.371 0.589 0.755 0.856 0.924 0.134 0.202 0.274 0.344 0.403 0.487
Splice
`2-radius 0.000 0.100 0.200 0.300 0.400 0.500 0.000 0.100 0.200 0.300 0.400 0.500
Euclidean 0.333 0.558 0.826 0.965 0.988 0.996 0.306 0.431 0.526 0.608 0.676 0.743
NCA 0.103 0.209 0.415 0.659 0.824 0.921 0.103 0.173 0.274 0.414 0.570 0.684
LMNN 0.149 0.332 0.630 0.851 0.969 0.994 0.149 0.241 0.357 0.492 0.621 0.722
ITML 0.279 0.571 0.843 0.974 0.995 0.997 0.279 0.423 0.525 0.603 0.675 0.751
LFDA 0.242 0.471 0.705 0.906 0.987 0.997 0.242 0.371 0.466 0.553 0.637 0.737
ARML (Ours) 0.128 0.221 0.345 0.509 0.666 0.819 0.128 0.196 0.273 0.380 0.497 0.639
Pendigits
`2-radius 0.000 0.100 0.200 0.300 0.400 0.500 0.000 0.100 0.200 0.300 0.400 0.500
Euclidean 0.039 0.126 0.316 0.577 0.784 0.937 0.036 0.085 0.155 0.248 0.371 0.528
NCA 0.038 0.196 0.607 0.884 0.997 1.000 0.038 0.103 0.246 0.428 0.637 0.804
LMNN 0.034 0.180 0.568 0.898 0.993 0.999 0.030 0.096 0.246 0.462 0.681 0.862
ITML 0.060 0.334 0.773 0.987 1.000 1.000 0.060 0.149 0.343 0.616 0.814 0.926
LFDA 0.047 0.228 0.595 0.904 1.000 1.000 0.043 0.104 0.248 0.490 0.705 0.842
ARML (Ours) 0.035 0.114 0.308 0.568 0.780 0.937 0.034 0.078 0.138 0.235 0.368 0.516
Satimage
`2-radius 0.000 0.150 0.300 0.450 0.600 0.750 0.000 0.150 0.300 0.450 0.600 0.750
Euclidean 0.101 0.579 0.842 0.899 0.927 0.948 0.091 0.237 0.482 0.682 0.816 0.897
NCA 0.117 0.670 0.886 0.915 0.936 0.961 0.101 0.297 0.564 0.746 0.876 0.931
LMNN 0.105 0.613 0.855 0.914 0.944 0.961 0.090 0.269 0.548 0.737 0.855 0.910
ITML 0.130 0.768 0.959 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.109 0.411 0.757 0.939 0.990 1.000
LFDA 0.128 0.779 0.904 0.958 0.995 1.000 0.112 0.389 0.673 0.860 0.950 0.986
ARML (Ours) 0.103 0.540 0.824 0.898 0.920 0.943 0.092 0.228 0.464 0.668 0.817 0.896
USPS
`2-radius 0.000 0.500 1.000 1.500 2.000 2.500 0.000 0.500 1.000 1.500 2.000 2.500
Euclidean 0.063 0.239 0.586 0.888 0.977 1.000 0.058 0.125 0.211 0.365 0.612 0.751
NCA 0.072 0.367 0.903 0.986 1.000 1.000 0.063 0.158 0.365 0.686 0.899 0.980
LMNN 0.062 0.856 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.055 0.359 0.890 0.999 1.000 1.000
ITML 0.082 0.696 0.999 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.072 0.273 0.708 0.987 1.000 1.000
LFDA 0.134 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.118 0.996 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
ARML (Ours) 0.057 0.203 0.527 0.867 0.971 0.997 0.053 0.118 0.209 0.344 0.572 0.785
hard-label black-box attack method, the Boundary Attack [3]. Different from the 1-NN case, since
both attack and robustness verification are not optimal, there will be a gap between the two numbers.
These results are shown in Table 2.
The three observations of Mahalanobis 1-NN also hold for the K-NN: NCA and LMNN have
improved clean errors (empirical robust errors at the radius 0) but this often comes with degraded
robust errors compared with the Euclidean distance, while ARML achieves good robust errors as well
as clean errors. The results suggest that ARML is more robust both provably (in terms of the certified
robust error) and empirically (in terms of the empirical robust error).
5 Related work
Metric Learning Metric learning aims to learn a new distance using supervision concerning the
learned distance [23]. In this paper, we mainly focus on the linear metric learning: the learned
distance is the squared Euclidean distance after applying the transformation G globally, i.e., the
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Mahalanobis distance [15, 12, 41, 20, 36]. There are also nonlinear models for metric learning, such
as kernelized metric learning [25, 6], local metric learning [14, 40] and deep metric learning [10, 32].
Robustness verification for nonlinear metric learning and learning a provably robust non-linear metric
would be an interesting future work.
Adversarial robustness of neural networks Empirical defense aims to learn a classifier which is
robust to some adversarial attacks [26, 29], but has no guarantee for the robustness to other stronger
(or unknown) adversarial attacks [4, 1]. In contrast, certified defense provides a guarantee that no
adversarial examples exist within a certain input region [43, 11, 48]. The basic idea of these certified
defense methods is to minimize the certified robust training error. However, all these methods for
neural networks rely on the assumption of smoothness of the classifier, and hence could not be applied
to the nearest neighbor classifiers.
Adversarial robustness of nearest neighbor classifiers Most works about adversarial robustness
of K-NN focus on adversarial attack. Some papers propose to attack a differentiable substitute of
K-NN [31, 33], and others formalize the attack as a list of quadratic programming problems or linear
programming problems [39, 46]. As far as we know, there is only one paper considering adversarial
verification for K-NN, but they only consider the Euclidean distance, and no certified defense method
is proposed [39]. In contrast, we propose the first adversarial verification method and the first certified
defense (or provably robust learning) for Mahalanobis K-NN.
6 Conclusion
We propose a novel metric learning method named ARML to obtain a robust Mahalanobis distance
that can be robust to adversarial input perturbations. Experiments show that the proposed method can
improve both clean errors and robust errors compared with existing metric learning algorithms.
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A Optimal value of triplet problem
The triplet problem is formalized as below:
min
δ
‖δ‖ s.t. dM (x+ δ,x−) ≤ dM (x+ δ,x+). (15)
It is equivalent to the optimization
min
δ
δ>δ s.t. a>δ ≤ b, (16)
where we have
a = M
(
x+ − x−) , (17)
b =
1
2
(
dM (x,x
+)− dM (x,x−)
)
. (18)
The dual function is
g(λ) = inf
δ
δ>δ + λ(a>δ − b) (19)
= −1
4
a>aλ2 − bλ, (20)
where inf holds for δ = −λa/2. Then the dual problem is
max
λ≥0
− 1
4
a>aλ2 − bλ. (21)
The optimal point is [
− 2b
a>a
]
+
, (22)
and the optimal value is {
0 if b ≥ 0
b2
a>a otherwise.
(23)
By the Slater’s condition, if x+ 6= x− holds, we have the strong duality. Therefore, the optimal value
of (15) is [ −b√
a>a
]
+
=
[dM (x,x
−)− dM (x,x+)]+
2
√
(x+ − x−)>M>M(x+ − x−) . (24)
In fact, it is easy to verify that even if x+ = x− obtains, the optimal value also holds.
B Proof of Theorem 1
Proof. Let (I,J) denote the optimal value of the inner minimization problem of (6). By relaxing the
constraint via replacing the universal quantifier, we have
(I,J) ≥ max
i∈{i:yi=ytest}−I,j∈J
˜(xi,xj ,xtest;M). (25)
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Algorithm 2: Computing the minimal adversarial perturbation for Mahalanobis 1-NN
Input: Test instance (xtest, ytest), dataset S = {(xi, yi)}Ni=1.
Output: Perturbation norm .
1 Initialize  =∞ ;
2 Sort {j : yj 6= ytest} by the ascending order of dM (xtest,xj);
3 for j : yj 6= ytest according to the ascending order do
4 Compute a lower bound (j) of the inner minimization corresponding to j;
5 if  <  then
6 Solve the inner minimization problem exactly via the greedy coordinate ascent method
and derive the optimal value (j);
7 if (j) <  then
8  = (j)
9 end
10 end
11 end
Substitute it in (6) and then we have
∗ ≥ min
I,J
(I,J) (26)
≥ min
I,J
max
i∈{i:yi=ytest}−I, j∈J
˜(x+i ,x
−
j ,xtest) (27)
≥ min
I,J
max
j∈J
max
i∈[{i:yi=ytest}−I
˜(x+i ,x
−
j ,xtest) (28)
≥ min
I,J
max
j∈J
kth max
i∈{i:yi=ytest}
˜(x+i ,x
−
j ,xtest) (29)
≥ min
I,J
kth min
j∈{j:yj 6=ytest}
kth max
i∈{i:yi=ytest}
˜(x+i ,x
−
j ,xtest) (30)
= kth min
j∈{j:yj 6=ytest}
kth max
i∈{i:yi=ytest}
˜(x+i ,x
−
j ,xtest) (31)
C Details of computing exact minimal adversarial perturbation
of Mahalanobis 1-NN
The overall algorithm is displayed in Algorithm 2. We denote (j) as the optimal value of the
inner minimization problem with respect to j, and denote (j) as its lower bound. We first sort
the subproblems according to the ascending order of ‖xj − xtest‖ for {j : yj 6= ytest}. For every
subproblem, we compute the lower bound of its optimal value. If the optimal value is too large, we
just screen the subproblem safely without solving it exactly.
C.1 Greedy coordinate ascent (descent)
For the subproblem we have to solve exactly, we employ the greedy coordinate ascent method. Note
that the inner minimization problem of (13) is a convex quadratic programming problem. We solve
the problem by dealing with its dual formulation. The greedy coordinate ascent method is used
because the optimal dual variables are very sparse. The algorithm is shown in Algorithm 3. At every
iteration, only one dual variable is updated.
C.2 Lower bound of inner minimization problem
The following theorem is dependent on the solution of the triplet problem.
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Algorithm 3: Greedy coordinate descent for QP: minx≥0 12x
>Px+ q>x
Input: P , q, , T .
1 x← 0, g ← Px+ q;
2 for t = 0 to T − 1 do
3 ∀i, yi ← max
(
xi − gipi,i , 0
)
− xi;
4 i∗ ← arg maxi|yi| ; // choose a coordinate
5 if then
6 break;
7 end
8 xi∗ ← xi∗ + yi∗ ; // update the solution
9 g ← g + yi∗pi∗ ; // update the gradient
10 end
Output: x.
Table 3: Dataset statisitcs
# features # classes # train # test 1-NN test error 11-NN test error
MNIST 784 10 60,000 10,000 0.031 0.033
Fashion-MNIST 784 10 60,000 10,000 0.150 0.150
Splice 60 2 1,000 2,175 0.295 0.291
Pendigits 16 10 7,494 3,498 0.023 0.027
Satimage 36 6 4,435 2,000 0.112 0.106
USPS 256 10 7,291 2,007 0.049 0.060
Theorem 2. The optimal value (j) of the inner minimization of (13) with respect to j is lower
bounded as
(j) ≥ max
i:yi=ytest
[˜(xi,xj ,xtest;M)]+ . (32)
Proof. Relaxing the constraint of (13) by means of replacing the universal quantifier, we know (j) is
lower bounded by the optimal value of the following optimization problem
max
i:yi=ytest
min
δi,j
‖δi,j‖ (33)
s.t. dM (xtest + δi,j ,xj) ≤ dM (xtest + δi,j ,xi). (34)
Obviously, the optimal value of the inner problem is [˜(xi,xj ,xtest;M)]+.
In this way, we could derive a lower bound of the optimal value in closed form.
D Experimental details
Datasets Dataset statistics and test errors (on all test instances) of Euclidean K-NN are shown in
Table 3. All training data are used to learn metrics, and 1,000 instances are randomly sampled to
compute certified robust errors.
Hyperparameters Hyperparameters of our ARML algorithm are fixed across all datasets. Specif-
ically, the size of the neighborhood where randnear+ and randnear− sample random instances
is 10. In other words, at every iteration, we sample one instance from the nearest 10 instances in
the same class with the test instance, and sample one instance from the nearest 10 instances in the
different classes from the test instance. We employ the Adam algorithm [21] to update parameters
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Figure 2: Sensitivity to neighborhood size on Splice
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Figure 3: Sensitivity to neighborhood size on Satimage
with gradients and the parameters is in the default setting (learning rate: 0.001, betas: (0.9, 0.999)).
The number of epochs is 1,000. The loss function is the negative loss.
Hyperparameter sensitivity We investigate the sensitivity of the size of neighborhood used for
randnear+ and randnear−. We plot the robust error curves against the `2 radius for different
neighborhood sizes in Figure 2 and Figure 3. It suggests that ARML is not very sensitive to this
hyperparameter in terms of certified and empirical robust errors if it is not too small.
Implementations of NCA, LMNN, ITML and LFDA We use the implementations of the metric-
learn library [13] for NCA, LMNN, ITML and LFDA. Similar to ARML, hyperparameters are fixed
across all datasets and are in the default setting. In particular, the maximum numbers of iterations for
NCA, LMNN and ITML are 1,000, 100 and 1,000 respectively.
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